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44 - ARMAS COMBINADAS 09



            them safer (fight for dominant positions not sub-  Leaders must realize that losing a fight does
            missions, start in a position on the ground [mount,   not undermine their credibility as a leader; re-
            guard, etc.] instead of standing or neutral). Lea-  fusing to fight undermines  their credibility  as
            ders should emphasize the drilling portions of     a leader because it demonstrates the lack of
            training over sparring initially, then slowly add   commitment to developing the  Warrior Ethos
            in the intensity. Lastly, the atmosphere around
            training must emphasize team improvement over      both  personally  and within  the  organization.
            personal ego. Leaders must reinforce good trai-         Unit  combatives  training  is  a  tool  that
            ning partner behavior by establishing expecta-     commanders at all levels can leverage to impact
            tions before training and controlling the environ-  the culture of their organization. Combatives pro-
            ment during training.
                                                               vides a realistic skill set that is increasingly rele-
            MACP and Leadership                                vant in the modern close quarter battle that re-
                                                               quires judicious application of lethal force. Even
                 A last obstacle to effective training that must
            be addressed is the ego of the leader. Often unit   more importantly, combatives training builds the
                                                               warrior mindset in a way that few training events
            combatives programs die in their infancy becau-    can.
            se leaders know that they must participate, and
            they are afraid of being embarrassed. Leaders
            will default to several common excuses to avoid
            training: “It’s too dangerous,” “We don’t have the
            certified personnel,” “I’m not combat arms,” or the
            ever popular, “I would just shoot you.” It is impor-
            tant  to  understand  that  none  of  these  excuses   Notes
            are grounded in reality; they are contrived to   1  Andrew Carroll, Letters of a Nation (NY: Broadway Books, 1999).
            protect the self-esteem of the leader and reveal   2  GEN Mark A. Milley and Mark T. Esper, “The Army Vision,” 2018, re-
                                                               trieved from https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/vision/the_
            that the leader does not truly have the Warrior    army_vision.pdf.
            Ethos. It is impossible to make a cogent argu-   3  Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army ‘Big Six’ Ramp Up in 2021: Learning
                                                               From FCS, ”Breaking Defense, 14 March 2019, retrieved from https://
            ment for the position that it is not important for   breakingdefense.com/2019/03/army-big-six-ramp-upin-2021-lear-
                                                               ning-from-fcs/.
            U.S. Army Soldiers to know how to fight. And yet,   “2019 Army Modernization Strategy: Investing in the Future,” retrie-
                                                               ved from https://www.army.mil/e2/downloads/rv7/2019_army_
            units routinely shut down combatives programs      modernization_strategy_final.pdf.
            for any of the excuses previously mentioned. This   4  Training Circular 3-25.150, Combatives, March 2017.
                                                             5  Bernard Montgomery,  “Bernard Montgomery  War Speech, Ma-
            is a formidable and well-entrenched problem.       roon Beret, D-Day,” retrieved from https://jackashley.wordpress.
            Leaders must address this obstacle by first re-    com/2011/01/17/bernard-montgomery-war-speech/.
                                                             6  Milley and Esper, “The Army Vision.”
            cognizing the excuses for what they are and offe-
                                                             7  “Why the British Army Needs a Combatives System,” Wavell Room, 9
            ring well-planned training solutions that address   February 2019, retrieved from https://wavellroom.com/2018/02/09/
                                                               why-the-british-army-needs-a-combatives-system/.
            the concerns. This returns to step one of building
                                                             8  Jeffrey Huber,  “Understanding Motor Learning Stages Improves
            a successful program: Establish a unit culture     Skill Instruction,”an excerpt from “Applying Educational Psychology
                                                               in Coaching Athletes,” Human Kinetics, retrieved from https://us.hu-
            that values fighting ability. Leaders must realize   mankinetics.com/blogs/excerpt/understanding-motor-learningsta-
                                                               ges-improves-skill-instruction.
            that losing a fight does not undermine their cre-
                                                             9  Department of Physical Education (DPE), U.S. Military  Academy,
            dibility as a leader; refusing to fight undermines   “Preparing  Tomorrow’s Leaders to Meet the Physical Demands
                                                               of the Army,” Operational Concept for the Physical Domain (2010).
            their credibility as a leader because it demons-   G.F. Cavanagh and D.J. Moberg, “The Virture of Courage Within the
                                                               Organization,” Research in Ethical Issues in Organizations (1999):
            trates the lack of commitment to developing the    1-25.
            Warrior Ethos both personally and within the or-  10  Avni A. Patel, Keith G. Hauret, Bonnie J. Taylor, and Bruce H. Jones,
                                                               “Non-Battle Injuries Among U.S. Army Soldiers Deployed to Afgha-
            ganization. Soldiers do not expect leaders to be   nistan and Iraq, 2001-2013,”  Journal of Safety Research 60 (Fe-
                                                               bruary 2017): 29-34.
            the best at every Soldier skill, but they do expect   11  J. Palmer, “DPE Annual Injury Report,” West  Point: Department  of
            them to be competent and resilient.                Physical Education, 2019.
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